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Contract | Family 14, Jurisdiction Variant Sets
Danish: databehandleraftale. Norwegian: databehandleravtale.
This document is the source of truth for: eu-article-28-terms, scc-incorporation-and-elections, marketing:/eu/legal/dpa
Those surfaces render this text from here. They do not keep their own copy, so they cannot drift from it.
Artefacts this one references or cannot be issued without.
Artefacts that would be blocked if this one were missing or out of date.
DPA-EU-001)DPA-EU-001 v1.0.0, Last Modified On 01 August 2026, Tier: Public
Danish: databehandleraftale. Norwegian: databehandleravtale.
| DM-1 Dedicated | DM-2 Shared | DM-3 Customer Cloud | DM-4 On-Premise |
|---|---|---|---|
EEA region, Pensieve Labs-operated |
EEA region, shared platform, per-tenant keys | Customer's own EEA project | Customer's premises, storage never leaves them |
In every model, remote access from India for support and operations is a restricted transfer and is
assessed as one, including in DM-4 where no data is stored outside the Customer's premises. This is the
point most vendors omit and every European data protection officer finds.
This is a standalone Article 28 processor agreement for a controller established in the European Union or the European Economic Area. It is not an Indian data processing agreement with a European annexure: the operative clauses below are the Article 28 clauses, in Article 28 order, using controller and processor vocabulary, and the Standard Contractual Clauses are incorporated into the operative text rather than appended as an afterthought.
Where this Agreement is executed, DPA-GL-001 and its Annexure V do not apply to the Processing to
which this Agreement applies.
1.1 Parties. This Data Processing Agreement is made between Customer legal name,
Customer entity type, of Customer address formatted (the "Controller") and
Edsol Edtech Pvt. Ltd., a company incorporated in India, of
28, Jamunather Bulandshahar Uttar Pradesh India (the "Processor").
1.2 Background. The Processor supplies the Controller with access to the Platform under the Master
Services Agreement: EU/EEA Variant (MSA-EU-001) together with the Order Form (the "Principal
Agreement"). In supplying the Platform the Processor processes personal data on the Controller's behalf.
This Agreement records the terms required by Article 28(3) of the GDPR and provides the safeguard required
by Chapter V for transfers to India.
1.3 Structure. This Agreement comprises these clauses and:
| Annex | Content | Function |
|---|---|---|
| I | Description of the Processing: parties, data subjects, categories, purposes, duration, locations | Populates Annex I.A, I.B and I.C of the Standard Contractual Clauses |
| II | Technical and organisational measures | Populates Annex II of the Standard Contractual Clauses |
| III | Sub-processors | Populates Annex III of the Standard Contractual Clauses |
| IV | Country schedules: Denmark and Norway | National overlays only; no restatement |
1.4 Precedence. Where a term of this Agreement conflicts with the Standard Contractual Clauses, the Standard Contractual Clauses prevail. Where a term of this Agreement conflicts with the Principal Agreement in respect of the Processing, this Agreement prevails. Nothing in the Principal Agreement is to be read as varying, contradicting or limiting the Standard Contractual Clauses.
1.5 Duration. This Agreement takes effect on the effective date of the Principal Agreement and continues for as long as the Processor processes personal data on the Controller's behalf, and thereafter in respect of the obligations expressed to survive.
2.1 Controller, processor, data subject, personal data, special categories of personal data, processing, personal data breach, supervisory authority and restricted transfer have the meanings given in the GDPR.
2.2 <DefinedTerm term="Customer Personal Data" /> means personal data processed by the Processor on the Controller's behalf under the Principal Agreement, as described in Annex I.
2.3 <DefinedTerm term="GDPR" /> means Regulation (EU) 2016/679, including as incorporated into the Agreement on the European Economic Area and as supplemented by the national law of the Controller's jurisdiction.
2.4 <DefinedTerm term="Standard Contractual Clauses" /> or "SCCs" means the standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to third countries adopted by Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2021/914 of 4 June 2021, as amended or replaced from time to time.
2.5 <DefinedTerm term="Sub-processor" /> means a processor engaged by the Processor to carry out processing activities on the Controller's behalf.
2.6 <DefinedTerm term="Deployment Model" /> means one of DM-1, DM-2, DM-3 or DM-4 as defined in
WPR-GL-004 and recorded at DM-1.
2.7 <DefinedTerm term="Break-Glass Access" /> means access by a named individual to Customer Personal Data in the clear, granted just in time, on the Controller's per-session approval, for a bounded period, under session recording, and expiring automatically.
2.8 Interpretation. References to Articles are to Articles of the GDPR. References to Clauses of the SCCs are to the clauses of the module applicable to the transfer concerned. Headings do not affect construction. "Including" is not limiting.
3.1 Roles. In respect of Customer Personal Data the Controller is the controller and the Processor is the processor. The Processor does not determine the purposes or the essential means of the processing.
3.2 Where the Controller is itself a processor. Where the Controller processes the personal data on behalf of a third-party controller, for example a hospital operating a shared record on behalf of a regional authority, the Controller warrants that it has that controller's authority to appoint the Processor as a sub-processor on these terms, and Module Three of the SCCs applies instead of Module Two. All other terms of this Agreement apply unchanged.
3.3 Where the Processor acts as controller. The Processor is a controller in respect of, and this
Agreement does not apply to: account and contact data of the Controller's administrative users held for
contract administration and billing; security telemetry and audit records the Processor is required to keep
for its own compliance; and aggregated statistics that contain no personal data. POL-EU-053 states the
Processor's own privacy notice for that processing. Product-usage telemetry is not used to develop or
improve the Platform in a way that requires access to Customer Personal Data, and the Processor does not
use Customer Personal Data to train any model that serves another customer.
3.4 Special categories. Customer Personal Data includes data concerning health, which is a special category of personal data under Article 9(1). The Controller's lawful basis in the treatment context is Article 9(2)(h) as implemented by the national law recorded in Annex IV, not consent. The Processor records this expressly so that the Controller's own record of processing does not default to a consent narrative.
3.5 The Processor makes no representation about the Controller's own compliance. The Controller is responsible for the lawfulness of the personal data it makes available, for its own record of processing, for its data protection impact assessment, for information to data subjects, and for the configuration of access rights inside the Platform.
4.1 The Processor processes Customer Personal Data only on the Controller's documented instructions, including as regards transfers to a third country, unless required to do otherwise by Union or Member State law to which the Processor is subject. Where such a requirement applies, the Processor informs the Controller of that legal requirement before processing, unless that law prohibits it on important grounds of public interest.
4.2 The instruction set. The Controller's documented instructions are: this Agreement, the Principal Agreement, the configuration the Controller makes in the Platform, and any further written instruction the Controller gives. Instructions given through the Platform's administrative interface, or through the Processor's support channel by a person the Controller has authorised, are documented instructions.
4.3 Unlawful instruction. The Processor immediately informs the Controller if, in its opinion, an instruction infringes the GDPR or other Union or Member State data protection provisions, and may suspend performance of that instruction until it is withdrawn, amended or confirmed in writing. Suspension under this clause is not a breach of the Principal Agreement.
4.4 Instructions outside scope. An instruction that requires materially more than the Processor is obliged to do under this Agreement (for example a bespoke extraction, an unscheduled migration, or support delivered from a specified location) may be charged at the rates in the Order Form. The Processor may not charge for anything Article 28 or Article 32 requires it to do.
4.5 No independent purposes. The Processor does not sell, rent, disclose for consideration, or use for its own marketing any Customer Personal Data, and does not combine it with data from another controller.
5.1 The Processor ensures that every person authorised to process Customer Personal Data has committed to confidentiality in writing, or is under an appropriate statutory obligation of confidentiality. The commitment survives the end of that person's engagement.
5.2 Access is limited to those persons who need it to perform the Principal Agreement. The Processor maintains a register of individuals authorised for production access and makes it available to the Controller on request under 13.3.
5.3 The Processor screens personnel before engagement to the extent permitted by applicable law, trains them on data protection and on the transfer restrictions in 11 and 12, and revokes access on the same Business Day that an engagement ends.
6.1 The Processor implements the technical and organisational measures in Annex II, which are designed to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk, having regard to the state of the art, the cost of implementation, and the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing, and to the risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons. The measures address in particular pseudonymisation and encryption, the ongoing confidentiality, integrity, availability and resilience of processing systems, the ability to restore availability and access in a timely manner after an incident, and a process for regularly testing, assessing and evaluating effectiveness.
6.2 No degradation. The Processor may update the measures in Annex II, but may not reduce the overall level of security. Where an update materially changes a measure the Controller relies on, the Processor notifies the Controller at least thirty (30) days in advance.
6.3 Per-model boundary: stated, not implied. The measures the Processor can implement differ by Deployment Model, and a single undifferentiated security statement would be untrue in at least one model.
| Measure | DM-1 | DM-2 | DM-3 | DM-4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Region and key location controlled by the Processor | Yes | Yes | Controller's project; Processor configures on instruction | Controller's premises |
| Physical and environmental security | Cloud provider | Cloud provider | Cloud provider, Controller's account | Controller |
| Network perimeter and segmentation | Yes | Yes | Shared with Controller | Controller |
| Patching of the Platform | Yes | Yes | Yes | , on the Controller's maintenance window |
| Patching of the host operating system and hardware firmware | Yes | Yes | Shared | Controller |
| Backup execution and restore testing | Yes | Yes | Yes | Controller, using the Processor's tooling |
| Availability and resilience objectives | Per DIS-GL-014 |
Per DIS-GL-014 |
Per DIS-GL-014, subject to the Controller's infrastructure |
Not undertaken for hardware the Processor does not control |
| Break-Glass Access controls | Yes | Yes | , with the Controller's own IAM as an additional gate | , and the Controller can physically disconnect |
6.4 Testing. The Processor commissions an independent security assessment of the Platform at least
annually, makes the summary available to the Controller, and makes the full report available under
non-disclosure. Edsol Edtech Pvt. Ltd. holds no security certification of any kind and does not represent
that it does; WPR-GL-005 states the assurance position and what compensates for the absence.
7.1 General authorisation. The Controller gives the Processor a general written authorisation to engage Sub-processors, on the terms of this clause. This corresponds to Option 2 of Clause 9(a) of the SCCs.
7.2 The list. The Sub-processors engaged at the date of this Agreement are listed in Annex III and
maintained at DIS-GL-009, which states for each one its name, its role, the country in which it
processes, and the transfer safeguard relied on.
7.3 Change notice. The Processor gives the Controller thirty (30) days' written notice of the
intended addition or replacement of a Sub-processor that will process Customer Personal Data. Notice is
given by email to the address in Annex I and by an entry in the change log DIS-GL-010, to which the
Controller may subscribe.
7.4 Objection. The Controller may object on reasonable grounds relating to data protection or security
within the notice period. On objection the Parties will discuss in good faith; if the Processor cannot
accommodate the objection within thirty (30) days, the Controller may terminate the affected Services
without liability for Charges in respect of the period after termination, and the Processor will supply
exit assistance. POL-GL-055 states the process.
7.5 Flow-down. The Processor imposes on each Sub-processor, by written contract, data protection obligations no less protective than those in this Agreement, including in particular the obligations in 6, 9, 11 and 12, and including the third-party beneficiary rights required by Clause 9(c) of the SCCs. A copy of the relevant terms is made available to the Controller on request, with commercial terms redacted.
7.6 Verification: the measure that answers the criticism. The Processor operates a documented
programme for verifying that its Sub-processors actually meet the obligations flowed down to them, rather
than merely contracting for them. The programme is described in POL-GL-135 and comprises, at minimum, for
each Sub-processor that processes Customer Personal Data:
The evidence of verification is available to the Controller on request. This clause exists because the absence of documented sub-processor verification, and specifically the absence of an assessment of transfers to sub-processors in third countries including India, is the deficiency for which European public bodies have been criticised by their own supervisory authority. The Processor is that third-country sub-processor, and the answer is a programme with evidence rather than an assurance.
7.7 Liability. Where a Sub-processor fails to fulfil its data protection obligations, the Processor remains fully liable to the Controller for the performance of that Sub-processor's obligations.
7.8 Not Sub-processors. A third-party system to which the Controller connects the Platform using the
Controller's own credentials (a national health service, a laboratory analyser, a payment gateway, an
insurer) is not a Sub-processor of the Processor. The Controller is the controller of that disclosure
and holds the relationship. DIS-GL-024 and DIS-GL-025 state the boundary and the credential-custody
model.
8.1 Taking into account the nature of the processing, the Processor assists the Controller by appropriate technical and organisational measures, insofar as possible, in fulfilling the Controller's obligation to respond to requests to exercise rights under Chapter III of the GDPR: access, rectification, erasure, restriction, portability, objection, and rights relating to automated decision making.
8.2 Self-service first. The Platform provides the Controller with the ability to access, correct, export, restrict and delete personal data records without the Processor's involvement. The Controller uses those functions where they are sufficient, and the Processor's assistance is available where they are not.
8.3 Response time. Where assistance is required, the Processor provides it within seven (7) Business Days of a written request, so that the Controller can meet the one-month period in Article 12(3). Where a request is complex, the Processor states within those seven days what it can provide and by when.
8.4 Requests received directly. If the Processor receives a request from a data subject relating to Customer Personal Data, it does not respond to the substance. It forwards the request to the Controller within two (2) Business Days, acknowledges receipt to the data subject stating that the Controller is responsible, and identifies the Controller where the data subject does not already know it.
8.5 Charges. Assistance under this clause is provided without additional charge where it is required by Article 28(3)(e). The Processor may charge, at the rates in the Order Form, for assistance that goes materially beyond that obligation, for example a bespoke forensic reconstruction of a record's history over several years.
8.6 Portability format. Where a data subject exercises the right to portability, the Processor supplies the data in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format, and states the format and schema so that the Controller can verify it.
9.1 Notification to the Controller. The Processor notifies the Controller of a personal data breach affecting Customer Personal Data without undue delay and in any event within four (4) hours of becoming aware of it. Article 33(2) requires notification without undue delay; the Processor fixes a four-hour outer limit so that the Controller can meet both its own 72-hour Article 33(1) obligation and, where it is an essential entity, its 24-hour early-warning obligation under the national transposition of the NIS2 Directive.
9.2 "Aware". Awareness arises when any Processor person or system holds information indicating that a breach may have occurred. It is not the point at which the breach is confirmed, scoped or understood. A clock that starts at certainty can be started whenever it is convenient.
9.3 Content of the notification. The first notification contains, so far as known, and thereafter is supplemented as information becomes available:
The notification is drafted so that the Controller can file its own regulatory report without a second request to the Processor. Where an element is unknown, the notification says so and states when it will be supplied.
9.4 Reporting responsibility. The Controller notifies the supervisory authority and, where required, the data subjects. The Processor does not notify a supervisory authority or a data subject on the Controller's behalf and does not represent that it can. The Processor supplies the content, the technical analysis and the evidence, and on request supplies a draft of the Article 34 communication and the list of affected data subjects.
9.5 Cooperation and evidence. The Processor cooperates with the Controller's investigation, preserves
evidence including logs for not less than the period stated in DIS-GL-034, and provides a written
post-incident review within ten (10) Business Days of containment or a dated interim review stating
why the full review is not yet possible.
9.6 Sub-processor breach. A breach at a Sub-processor is a breach for the purposes of this clause and the same clocks apply, running from the Processor's awareness.
9.7 No admission. A notification under this clause is not an admission of fault or of liability.
DIS-EU-016 states the commitment in the customer-facing form and is the source of truth for it.
10.1 Taking into account the nature of the processing and the information available to it, the Processor assists the Controller in ensuring compliance with Articles 32 to 36.
10.2 Data protection impact assessment. The Processor supplies, without additional charge, a
processor input pack for the Controller's data protection impact assessment, comprising: the
description of the processing in Annex I, the measures in Annex II, the data-flow description in
DIS-GL-006, the sub-processor register DIS-GL-009, the retention and deletion positions in
DIS-GL-023, the remote-access model in DIS-GL-033 and the transfer impact assessment REP-GL-021. It
responds to written follow-up questions within ten (10) Business Days.
10.3 The assessment remains the Controller's. The Processor does not carry out the Controller's impact assessment, does not sign it, and does not warrant its adequacy. Processing of health data on a large scale will ordinarily require one; the Processor's role is to make it cheap to produce rather than to produce it.
10.4 Prior consultation. Where the Controller consults a supervisory authority under Article 36, the Processor supplies the information the authority requests of the processor, within the authority's deadline, and informs the Controller of any direct contact it has with the authority about the Controller's processing.
10.5 Risk-assessment input. Where the Controller's own sector framework requires a supplier risk analysis, the Processor supplies the input pack described in the applicable country schedule in Annex IV.
This clause is the reason the Agreement exists in this form. It is written to be read by the Controller's data protection officer first.
11.1 No adequacy decision. There is no adequacy decision under Article 45 for India, and none is in prospect. Every transfer of Customer Personal Data to the Processor in India therefore requires an Article 46 safeguard.
11.2 Incorporation of the Standard Contractual Clauses. The Standard Contractual Clauses are incorporated into this Agreement by reference and form an integral part of it, and are entered into between the Controller as data exporter and the Processor as data importer on execution of this Agreement, without any further act being required. The Clauses are used unmodified; modification would forfeit the mechanism.
11.3 Module. Module Two (controller to processor) applies where the Controller is a controller. Module Three (processor to processor) applies instead where 3.2 applies. The Processor enters into Module Three with each Sub-processor to which it makes an onward transfer from the EEA.
11.4 Elections. The Parties' elections are made here once, so that nothing remains to be negotiated:
| SCC provision | Election |
|---|---|
| Clause 7: docking clause | Included. A further entity may accede as exporter or importer by completing Annex I.A and signing. |
| Clause 9(a): sub-processors | Option 2, general written authorisation. Notice period thirty (30) days, per 7.3. |
| Clause 11(a): independent dispute resolution body | Not included. The optional redress-body paragraph is omitted. |
| Clause 13 and Annex I.C: competent supervisory authority | As stated in Annex I.C. |
| Clause 17: governing law | Option 1: the law of the Member State or EEA State in which the data exporter is established, being the Controller's jurisdiction. |
| Clause 18(b): choice of forum | The courts of the Controller's jurisdiction. |
| Annex I.A: list of parties | Annex I Section 1 |
| Annex I.B: description of the transfer | Annex I Sections 2 to 7 |
| Annex I.C: competent supervisory authority | Annex I Section 8 |
| Annex II: technical and organisational measures | Annex II, including Section II-5 (measures relied on for transfers) |
| Annex III: list of sub-processors | Annex III |
11.5 EEA States that are not Member States. Where the Controller is established in an EEA State that is not a Member State of the Union, the GDPR applies through the EEA Agreement and the Clauses apply with the adaptations that follow from that incorporation: references to Member State law are read as references to the law of that State, references to the competent supervisory authority as references to that State's authority, and references to Union law as references to the corresponding provisions as incorporated.
11.6 The transfer map, leg by leg. The Parties record the map so that the legs are not conflated in the Controller's own assessment. Conflation is the most common defect in a vendor transfer annex and it hides the leg that carries the risk.
| Leg | Exporter → importer | Location | What moves | Basis | Models |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Controller (EEA) → Processor (India) | India | Remote access for support and operations. No bulk storage or backup | SCCs Module Two plus 12 and REP-GL-021 |
All four |
| 2 | Processor → cloud infrastructure provider | EEA region at Deal data region |
Storage and processing at rest | Intra-EEA processing; no Chapter V transfer where the region and the contracting entity are in the EEA | DM-1, DM-2 |
| 3 | Processor → any Sub-processor outside the EEA | Per Annex III | Support tooling, monitoring, ticketing metadata | SCCs Module Three plus an assessment per destination | Per Annex III |
| 4 | Controller → the Controller's own connected systems | Per the Controller's arrangements | Clinical and administrative data under the Controller's own credentials | The Controller's own transfers. DIS-GL-024 |
All four |
Under DM-3 and DM-4 leg 2 does not exist because the infrastructure is the Controller's. Leg 1 is
unchanged in every model, because remote access from India is a transfer whether or not the data is
hosted in the EEA.
11.7 Transfer impact assessment. The Processor maintains a transfer impact assessment for transfers to
India, prepared on the six-step method in the European Data Protection Board's Recommendations 01/2020,
and supplies it to the Controller. It is published as REP-GL-021. Its conclusion is stated here rather
than buried, because the Controller's data protection officer will reach it in any event:
Indian law does not, on its face, provide a level of protection essentially equivalent to that guaranteed within the Union. The compulsion powers relied on by the Indian state, including under section 69 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and the rules made under it, section 5(2) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, and the production powers of the criminal procedure statute, are not subject to independent prior authorisation of the kind the European Essential Guarantees contemplate, and an effective remedy is not clearly available to a data subject who is not resident in India. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 contains broad exemptions in favour of the State.
The transfer is nonetheless defensible, measure by measure, because the supplementary measures in 12 reduce what is available to be compelled in India to pseudonymised data under keys held in the EEA. It is not defensible on the basis that India is essentially equivalent, and the Processor does not assert that it is.
11.8 No reliance on derogations. The Processor does not rely on an Article 49 derogation. Article 49 derogations are for occasional transfers and are not a lawful basis for systematic remote support. The Processor holds no binding corporate rules and does not claim any.
11.9 Onward transfer prohibition. The Processor does not disclose Customer Personal Data to a recipient outside the EEA except as recorded in Annex III, under Module Three of the SCCs, and after the assessment required by 7.6.
The measures below are committed as controls, not as undertakings, and they are the reason the transfer in 11.6 Leg 1 is defensible. They are in addition to Annex II, and their failure is a breach of this Agreement.
| # | Measure | Commitment | Models |
|---|---|---|---|
| S1 | EEA data residency | Customer Personal Data, backups and logs are stored and processed in the EEA region recorded at Deal data region. The Processor does not replicate them outside the EEA. The region is a contractual term, not a configuration setting |
DM-1, DM-2, DM-3 |
| S2 | Key custody outside the importer's jurisdiction | Encryption keys are held in the EEA. Where the Controller requires it, the Controller holds the keys in its own key management service so that the Processor cannot decrypt without the Controller's key | DM-1, DM-2, DM-3 |
| S3 | No key material reachable from India | Identity and access policy denies key access from outside the EEA administrative boundary | DM-1, DM-2 |
| S4 | Pseudonymisation with the mapping held by the exporter | The mapping between the national patient identifier and the internal record identifier is held under a key the Controller controls. Support tooling resolves pseudonymous records by default | All |
| S5 | No standing plaintext access from India | Plaintext access is Break-Glass Access only: named individual, just in time, approved by the Controller per session, time-boxed, automatically expiring | All |
| S6 | Session recording | Every Break-Glass session is recorded in full and the recording is available to the Controller | All |
| S7 | Administrative access terminated in the EEA | All administrative access is terminated on a jump host resident in the EEA. There is no direct network path from India to a production system | DM-1, DM-2 |
| S8 | Immutable access log visible to the Controller | The Controller can verify S4, S5 and S7 from its own audit view without the Processor's cooperation. The engineer cannot alter the record of the access | All |
| S9 | Duty to challenge | 14 | All |
| S10 | Published government-access procedure | POL-GL-067, with a named legal owner |
All |
| S11 | Transparency reporting | The Processor publishes a periodic transparency report. Where the count of demands is zero, the report states zero | All |
| S12 | Annual independent assessment | 6.4 and the audit right at 13 | All |
| S13 | Suspension trigger | 12.2 | All |
12.1 The load-bearing measure is S5. Where an importer requires access to data in the clear in order to provide the service, supplementary technical measures do not rescue the transfer and the whole weight falls onto the assessment of the destination country's law, which does not support it. The Controller should test S5 during evaluation by asking to see the approval flow, rather than accepting it as a statement.
12.2 Suspension. Where the Processor becomes unable to comply with the SCCs, or where a change in Indian law or practice makes a supplementary measure ineffective, the Processor notifies the Controller without undue delay under Clause 14(f) and Clause 16 of the SCCs, suspends the affected transfer, in practice by suspending access from India and operating from within the EEA, or by handing operational control to the Controller, and the Controller may terminate the affected Services under 16.3.
12.3 Re-assessment triggers. REP-GL-021 is re-assessed at least annually and immediately on: a
change in Indian law affecting state access; a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union
affecting Article 46 transfers; guidance or an enforcement decision of the Controller's own supervisory
authority affecting third-country transfers; receipt by the Processor of any government access demand
relating to customer data; a change to the hosting region, the key custody arrangement or the support
access model; the addition of a Sub-processor in a third country; a change of Deployment Model; or a
finding that any measure in this clause is not in fact implemented.
12.4 The honest alternative. A Controller that will not accept any processing from India should
elect DM-3 or DM-4, where it controls the access path itself, or should require that all support be
performed from within the EEA at the uplift stated in the Order Form. The Processor will not claim that
the Standard Contractual Clauses make offshore access invisible to a supervisory authority.
13.1 Information. The Processor makes available to the Controller all information necessary to demonstrate compliance with Article 28, including the current versions of Annexes I to III, the documents named in 10.2, the evidence of sub-processor verification under 7.6, and the summary of the most recent independent security assessment.
13.2 Audit. The Controller, or an auditor it mandates, may audit the Processor's compliance with this Agreement once in any twelve-month period, and additionally after a personal data breach affecting the Controller or where a supervisory authority requires it. The Controller gives thirty (30) days' notice, audits during business hours, does not unreasonably disrupt operations, and is bound by confidentiality. The Processor contributes to the audit. Each Party bears its own costs, save that the Processor may charge at the Order Form rates for a second or subsequent audit in the same period that is not required by a supervisory authority.
13.3 What an audit may reach. The audit may cover the Processor's policies, procedures, the register of individuals with production access, access logs relating to the Controller's own environment, the configuration of the measures in Annex II and 12, and the evidence of sub-processor verification. It may not reach another controller's data, another customer's environment, or information whose disclosure would create a security risk to another customer; where access is refused on that ground the Processor states the ground in writing.
13.4 Sub-processor audits. The Processor procures for the Controller equivalent audit rights against Sub-processors, or exercises its own rights on the Controller's behalf and reports the result.
13.5 Supervisory authority. The Processor cooperates with, and submits to the powers of, the Controller's supervisory authority in respect of the processing under this Agreement, and permits an audit by that authority under Clause 8.9 of the SCCs.
14.1 Notification. If the Processor receives a legally binding request from a public authority, including a judicial authority, for disclosure of Customer Personal Data, it notifies the Controller promptly and, where possible, before responding. If it is prohibited from notifying, it uses best efforts to obtain a waiver of the prohibition, documents those efforts, and provides the documentation to the Controller at the earliest opportunity.
14.2 Aggregate information. Where notification is prohibited, the Processor provides the maximum information it is lawfully able to, on a regular basis and in aggregate form, and publishes it in the transparency report at S11.
14.3 Challenge. The Processor reviews the legality of every such request, challenges it where there are reasonable grounds to consider it unlawful under the law of the requesting jurisdiction, applicable obligations under international law and principles of international comity, and pursues appeal options. It seeks interim measures with a view to suspending the effect of the request until the competent judicial authority has decided. It does not disclose more than the minimum permissible on a reasonable interpretation of the request.
14.4 Records. The Processor documents every request, the assessment made and the action taken, and makes the record available to the Controller and to the competent supervisory authority on request.
14.5 No back door. The Processor has not created, and will not create, any facility for a public
authority to access Customer Personal Data directly, and it is not subject to any obligation to provide
systematic access to a foreign authority. As at 01 August 2026 the Processor has received no
government request for a customer's personal data. The published policy is POL-GL-067.
14.6 Onward. Every Sub-processor is bound to equivalent obligations, and a request received by a Sub-processor is treated as a request received by the Processor for the purposes of this clause.
15.1 The Controller's choice. At the end of the provision of the Services the Processor, at the Controller's choice, deletes or returns all Customer Personal Data and deletes existing copies, unless Union or Member State law requires storage of the personal data.
15.2 Export window. The Controller exercises its choice in writing during the export window in the Principal Agreement. Absent a choice, the Processor deletes. The Processor does not retain data on the basis of silence.
15.3 Export. Where return is chosen, the Processor delivers a complete, readable, self-describing export in the format recorded in the Order Form, together with the schema, a record count and a checksum, so that the Controller can verify completeness independently. The format is a contractual term.
15.4 Deletion. Deletion is performed in accordance with DIS-GL-023, including the treatment of
backups, and is certified in writing with the date, the scope, the method and the residual-backup expiry
date. Backup media are overwritten on their ordinary rotation; the Processor states the maximum residual
period rather than claiming instantaneous erasure.
15.5 The Controller's own retention duty survives. National law imposes a clinical-record retention obligation on the Controller which is not discharged by this Agreement and which may outlive it. The period applicable in the Controller's jurisdiction is stated in Annex IV. Planning for it is the Controller's responsibility, and the Processor's obligation is to make the export good enough that the Controller can meet it.
15.6 DM-4. In DM-4 the data is on the Controller's premises. The Processor's obligation is limited
to deleting any copy in its own systems, including support artefacts, and certifying that it has done so.
16.1 Liability. The limitation of liability in the Principal Agreement applies to this Agreement, save
as varied by clause 10 of MSA-EU-001, and save that nothing limits a Party's liability to a data
subject or to a supervisory authority under the GDPR, or either Party's liability under Clause 12 of the
SCCs.
16.2 Apportionment. Article 82(5) applies: a Party that has paid full compensation may claim back from the other the part corresponding to that other's responsibility.
16.3 Termination for a transfer failure. The Controller may terminate the affected Services immediately on written notice, without liability for Charges in respect of the period after termination, where 12.2 applies, or where a supervisory authority or a court prohibits or suspends the transfer, or where the Processor is in material breach of 11 or 12 and has not remedied it within fifteen (15) Business Days of notice.
16.4 Survival. Clauses 5, 9, 13, 14, 15 and 16 survive termination, as do the SCCs to the extent of any personal data still held.
16.5 Amendment. This Agreement may be amended only in writing signed by both Parties, save that the Processor may update Annexes II and III in accordance with 6.2 and 7.3, and save that where the European Commission adopts a replacement for the SCCs the Parties will execute the replacement within the transition period the adopting decision allows, without reopening commercial terms.
| Data exporter | Data importer | |
|---|---|---|
| Name | Customer legal name |
Edsol Edtech Pvt. Ltd. |
| Address | Customer address formatted |
`28, Jamunather |
| Bulandshahar | ||
| Uttar Pradesh | ||
| India` | ||
| Contact | Customer primary contact name, Customer primary contact email |
[TO BE SUPPLIED], info@pensievelabs.org |
| Activities relevant to the transfer | Provision of hospital services; operation of the Platform as controller | Operation, support and maintenance of the Platform as processor |
| Role | Controller (Module Two); processor where 3.2 applies (Module Three) | Processor |
| Signature and date | Execution block below | Execution block below |
Patients and their next of kin or legal representatives; the Controller's clinical, nursing, administrative and support personnel; referring clinicians; suppliers' contact persons; and visitors where the Controller records them. Where the Controller treats children, personal data of children is processed and the Controller's national-law conditions apply.
Identification and contact data, including the national personal identification number where the Controller uses one; demographic data; encounter, admission, transfer and discharge data; appointment and scheduling data; clinical documentation the Controller records; medication data; order, result and report references; billing, tariff and payer data; consent records; employment and rostering data for the Controller's personnel; and system access and audit records.
Data concerning health, in every deployment. Depending on the Controller's configuration, data revealing racial or ethnic origin, religious belief, or data concerning a natural person's sex life or sexual orientation, where the Controller records them clinically. Genetic and biometric data only where the Order Form records the corresponding module as in scope.
Applied restrictions: the measures in Annex II, and in particular S4 pseudonymisation, S5 no standing plaintext access and S8 the immutable access log.
Continuous for legs 2 and 3 of 11.6. For leg 1, on an occasional and controlled basis only: Break-Glass Access is exceptional and per-session approved, and continuous access from India is limited to pseudonymised records, aggregate operational metrics, identifier-suppressed application logs, configuration and metadata.
Hosting, storage, transmission, display, search, backup, restoration, indexing, reporting, configuration, support, incident investigation, and the export of data on the Controller's instruction, in each case for the purpose of operating the Platform for the Controller's provision of health services and its administration.
| Item | Position |
|---|---|
| Duration of processing | The term of the Principal Agreement, plus the export window and the backup residual period |
| Retention | Determined by the Controller. The national clinical-record retention rule applicable to the Controller is stated in Annex IV and is the Controller's obligation |
| Storage location | The EEA region recorded at Deal data region (DM-1, DM-2); the Controller's own EEA project (DM-3); the Controller's premises (DM-4) |
| Backup location | Same as storage location |
| Access location | The EEA, plus India for the restricted categories in Section 5 |
The supervisory authority of the EEA State in which the Controller is established, being the authority recorded in the Order Form. Where the Controller is not established in the Union but its processing is subject to the GDPR under Article 3(2), the authority of the Member State in which the Controller's Article 27 representative is established.
| Purpose | Controller | Processor |
|---|---|---|
| Data protection | Customer primary contact email |
info@pensievelabs.org |
| Security incidents | As recorded in the Order Form | info@pensievelabs.org |
| Sub-processor change notice | As recorded in the Order Form | info@pensievelabs.org |
Measures are stated as implemented controls. Where a control differs by Deployment Model, 6.3 governs and the difference is not elided here.
| # | Measure | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Encryption at rest | All Customer Personal Data and backups encrypted at rest with keys held in the EEA. Specification in DIS-GL-011 |
| 2 | Encryption in transit | TLS 1.2 or 1.3 on every external and internal service-to-service path |
| 3 | Key management | Managed key service in the EEA region, with customer-managed keys available and customer-held external keys available on request. Rotation and separation of duties per POL-GL-129 |
| 4 | Per-tenant keys in DM-2 |
Each tenant's data is encrypted under a distinct key; DIS-GL-032 states the isolation model |
| 5 | Pseudonymisation | Identifier-to-record mapping held under a key the Controller controls; support views resolve pseudonymous records by default |
| # | Measure | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| 6 | Identity and access management | Role-based access, least privilege, no shared accounts, quarterly access review recorded in the access review register. DIS-GL-012 |
| 7 | Multi-factor authentication | Enforced for every administrative and production access path. Phishing-resistant factors for privileged roles. POL-GL-115 |
| 8 | Privileged access management | Separate privileged identities, second-approver control on production change, no standing production privilege. POL-GL-128, POL-GL-134 |
| 9 | Remote access model | Named individuals, just-in-time grants, EEA-terminated jump host, session recording, automatic expiry. DIS-GL-033 |
| 10 | Network security | Private networking between components, deny-by-default egress, no public database endpoints, segmentation per tenant. POL-GL-114 |
| 11 | Audit logging | Immutable, tamper-evident access and change logs, visible to the Controller, retained per DIS-GL-034. DIS-GL-013 |
| 12 | Input validation and application security | Secure development lifecycle, dependency scanning, static and dynamic testing before release. DIS-GL-018 |
| 13 | Anti-malware and endpoint control | Managed endpoints, disk encryption, screen lock, remote wipe. POL-GL-119, POL-GL-105 |
| 14 | Segregation of environments | Production, staging and development are separate projects with separate credentials; production data is not used in non-production. POL-GL-127 |
| 15 | Availability | Redundancy and recovery objectives per DIS-GL-014, per Deployment Model |
| # | Measure | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| 16 | Backup | Automated, encrypted, in the same EEA region, with the frequency and retention in DIS-GL-014 |
| 17 | Restore testing | Tested at the cadence in DIS-GL-014, with the result recorded in REP-GL-015 |
| 18 | Business continuity and disaster recovery | Documented, exercised, with the exercise report in REP-GL-013. POL-GL-106 |
| 19 | Vulnerability management | Severity classes and remediation windows in DIS-GL-017; coordinated disclosure under POL-GL-059 |
| 20 | Independent assessment | At least annual, summary published, full report under non-disclosure |
| # | Measure | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| 21 | Information security management | Documented management system mapped to ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A. Edsol Edtech Pvt. Ltd. is not certified to ISO/IEC 27001; the statement of applicability is published without a certificate |
| 22 | Personnel | Pre-engagement screening to the extent lawful, written confidentiality undertakings, role-based training, revocation on exit the same Business Day. DIS-GL-020 |
| 23 | Data classification and handling | DIS-GL-022, POL-GL-109 |
| 24 | Records management and clinical-record integrity | Authorship attribution, amendment as an append-only correction with the original preserved, and a complete access history, so that the Controller can meet its national record-keeping regulation |
| 25 | Change management | Reviewed, approved, reversible changes with a documented rollback. DIS-GL-031 |
| 26 | Sub-processor governance | POL-GL-135 and the verification programme at 7.6 |
| 27 | Incident response | POL-GL-112, exercised annually |
The measures in 12 (S1 to S13) are incorporated into this Annex and are the measures relied on for the purposes of Clause 14 of the SCCs. They are stated there rather than repeated here so that a change is made once.
The authoritative, dated list is the Subprocessor Register DIS-GL-009, published at
https://trust.pensievelabs.org, with the change feed at DIS-GL-010. It states for each Sub-processor its
legal name, its role, the country in which it processes, the categories of personal data it may process,
and the transfer safeguard.
This Annex incorporates that register as at the date of execution, and the version identifier is recorded in the Order Form so that the Parties can prove which version was incorporated.
| Category | Position |
|---|---|
| Cloud infrastructure | One provider, processing in the EEA region at Deal data region. Named in DIS-GL-009 |
| Platform sub-processors that process Customer Personal Data | Named in DIS-GL-009 Section 1, each with its transfer safeguard |
| Corporate and Trust Center sub-processors that do not process Customer Personal Data | Named separately in DIS-GL-009 Section 2, so that the Controller's assessment is not padded with irrelevant entries |
| The Controller's own connected systems | Not sub-processors. 7.8 |
Changes are notified under 7.3 with a thirty-day objection window under 7.4.
These are overlays. They state only what differs, and they do not restate a clause above.
| Item | Position |
|---|---|
| Vocabulary | dataansvarlig / databehandler; this instrument is the databehandleraftale |
| Supplementary national law | databeskyttelsesloven |
| National personal identification number | The CPR number is regulated by Section 11 of databeskyttelsesloven and sits outside Article 9. Its processing by a private entity is lawful where required by law, where the data subject has given explicit consent, or where unique identification is decisive and required. The Controller records its basis in its own record of processing; the Processor processes it only on instruction, and measure S4 applies to it specifically |
| Lawful basis in treatment | sundhedsloven |
| Clinical-record retention | Not less than ten (10) years from the most recent entry in the record. This is a rolling per-record clock, not a fixed term from creation, and it survives the patient's death. The Processor implements it as a rolling clock |
| Breach convention | The Danish market convention of 24-hour processor-to-controller notification is met and exceeded by the four-hour commitment at 9.1 |
| NIS family | The national transposition of the NIS2 Directive is in force; the Controller's early-warning clock is 24 hours |
| Delta pack | eu/dk/ |
| Item | Position |
|---|---|
| Vocabulary | dataansvarlig / databehandler; this instrument is the databehandleravtale |
| Supplementary national law | personopplysningsloven, which incorporates the GDPR |
| Health-sector statute | pasientjournalloven and pasientjournalforskriften. Section 12 of the regulation requires the dataansvarlig to have control and overview of all processing of health information for which it is responsible, including making information available to other undertakings. Annex I Section 7 and Annex III are supplied so that the Controller can discharge that obligation, and are updated on change |
| Access control | The access-control requirements of the regulation are met by measures 6 to 11 of Annex II; the Controller configures entitlements |
| Sector norm | The Norwegian health sector's information security and privacy norm binds a supplier through this Agreement. Where the Controller requires conformance to a specific version, the control mapping is agreed in the Order Form or an addendum, and the Processor states plainly which requirements it meets and which it does not. The Processor holds no certification and no accepted self-declaration against that norm as at 01 August 2026 |
| National infrastructure | Connection to the national health network, the national identity service and mandatory registry reporting are outside the scope of this Agreement and are not represented as delivered. DIS-GL-024 states the boundary |
| NIS family | The national implementation of the NIS2 Directive was not in force as at 01 August 2026; 9.1 applies contractually regardless [verify at signature] |
| Delta pack | eu/no/ |
Executed on 01 August 2026. Execution of this Agreement constitutes execution of the Standard
Contractual Clauses incorporated by 11.2, including their Appendix as populated by Annexes I
to III.
For Customer legal name (Controller / data exporter) |
For Edsol Edtech Pvt. Ltd. (Processor / data importer) |
|---|---|
Name: Customer signatory name |
Name: [TO BE SUPPLIED] |
Designation: Customer signatory designation |
Designation: Director |
| Signature: | Signature: |
| Date: | Date: |
Signature method: advanced or qualified electronic signature under Regulation (EU) 910/2014, or wet ink.
| ID | Artefact |
|---|---|
MSA-EU-001 |
Master Services Agreement (EU/EEA Variant) |
REP-GL-021 |
Transfer Impact Assessment: EU/EEA to India |
DIS-GL-009, DIS-GL-010 |
Subprocessor Register and change log |
DIS-EU-008 |
Data Residency Statement (EEA) |
DIS-EU-016 |
Breach Notification Commitment (GDPR) |
DIS-GL-033 |
Remote Access & Support Model |
POL-GL-067 |
Legal and Law Enforcement Request Policy |
POL-GL-135 |
Sub-Processor Management Policy: the verification programme |
CHK-GL-033 |
GDPR Article 28 processor obligations checklist |
| Version | Date | Author | Summary |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.0.0 | 01 August 2026 |
Privacy | First issue. Standalone Article 28 agreement for EEA controllers with SCC Module Two incorporated in the operative text and elections pre-made; supersedes DPA-GL-001 Annexure V where executed. |