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Disclosure | Family 3, Security, Privacy & Trust Disclosures
This document states commitments, not intentions. Each one is measurable after the fact against the incident record, and the incident record is disclosable to the affected hospital.
This document states commitments, not intentions. Each one is measurable after the fact against the incident record, and the incident record is disclosable to the affected hospital.
DM-1 Dedicated |
DM-2 Shared |
DM-3 Customer Cloud |
DM-4 On-Premise |
|---|---|---|---|
Pensieve Labs detects and notifies |
Same | Pensieve Labs detects inside the hospital's project; the hospital's own tooling also applies |
**Pensieve Labs has no visibility of hospital infrastructure and cannot detect an incident on it** (Section 7) |
To state, in advance and in public, how fast Pensieve Labs will tell a hospital that something has
happened, what it will tell them, and why the number is what it is.
The number matters because of arithmetic, not sentiment. An Indian hospital must report a reportable cyber
incident to CERT-In within six hours of noticing it. If its software vendor takes a day to tell it, the
hospital cannot comply. Pensieve Labs's four-hour commitment exists to leave the hospital two hours to
act, and it is contractual rather than aspirational.
| Commitment | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Notify the affected hospital of a personal data breach or a reportable security incident | Within 4 hours of Pensieve Labs becoming aware |
DPA-GL-001 (contractual) |
| Acknowledge a hospital-reported suspected incident | Within the Severity 1 response time in SLA-GL-001 |
SLA-GL-001 |
| Provide notification content sufficient for the hospital to file its own regulatory report without a second round trip | With the first notification | Section 3 |
| Provide a written post-incident review to every affected hospital | Within 10 business days of containment, or a dated interim review with the reason | Section 5 |
| Acknowledge an externally reported vulnerability | 3 business days | POL-GL-059 |
| Complete triage of an externally reported vulnerability | 10 business days | POL-GL-059 |
| Preserve incident evidence, including logs, for the retention period | Not less than 365 days | DIS-GL-034 |
"Aware" means the point at which any Pensieve Labs person or system has information indicating an
incident may have occurred. It does not mean the point at which the incident is confirmed, triaged,
scoped or understood. The clock starts at awareness, not at certainty, because a clock that starts at
certainty can be started whenever it is convenient.
An incident affecting an Indian hospital starts three statutory clocks in parallel.
Pensieve Labs's commitment is designed so that the hospital can meet the ones that bind it.
flowchart LR
D["T0<br/>Pensieve Labs becomes aware"] --> P["≤4 hours<br/>Pensieve Labs notifies the hospital<br/>with reportable content"]
P --> C["≤6 hours from the hospital<br/>noticing the incident<br/>Hospital reports to CERT-In"]
P --> B["Without delay, then 72 hours<br/>Hospital reports to the<br/>Data Protection Board"]
P --> R["Without delay<br/>Hospital notifies affected<br/>Data Principals"]
Text description. At time zero Pensieve Labs becomes aware of an incident. Within four hours it
notifies the hospital with content sufficient for the hospital's own filings. That notification feeds three
separate hospital obligations that run in parallel: a report to CERT-In within six hours of the hospital
noticing; an initial report to the Data Protection Board without delay followed by a detailed report within
72 hours; and notification of each affected Data Principal without delay.
| # | Clock | Window | Who reports | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | Pensieve Labs → hospital |
≤ 4 hours from Pensieve Labs's awareness |
Edsol Edtech Pvt. Ltd. |
DPA-GL-001, contractual |
| 1 | Hospital → CERT-In | 6 hours from noticing | Hospital | CERT-In Directions of 28 April 2022, Direction (ii), issued under s.70B(6) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 |
| 2 | Hospital → Data Protection Board | Without delay, then a detailed report within 72 hours | Hospital | Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025, Rule 7(2), in force from 14 May 2027 |
| 3 | Hospital → affected Data Principals | Without delay | Hospital | Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025, Rule 7(1), in force from 14 May 2027 |
The hospital reports, not Pensieve Labs. In all four deployment models the hospital is the Data
Fiduciary and holds the regulatory reporting obligation. Edsol Edtech Pvt. Ltd. is the Data Processor: it
supplies the content, the technical analysis and the evidence, and it has its own independent obligation to
report incidents affecting its own systems to CERT-In. Pensieve Labs does not report on the hospital's
behalf and does not represent that it can.
For an EEA hospital the operative document is
DIS-EU-016(Breach Notification Commitment: GDPR), which maps all six clocks: the processor clock, the Article 33 clock, the Article 34 communication and the three NIS2 clocks, and states whichPensieve Labsoutput feeds each filing. The commitment value is identical; only the clock map differs.
| Market | Clock the hospital must meet | Pensieve Labs's commitment |
|---|---|---|
| Australia | Notifiable data breach assessment and notification under the Privacy Act, and the separate My Health Records regime where applicable | The same 4-hour notification |
| Denmark, Norway | Controller notification to the supervisory authority within 72 hours under Article 33 of the General Data Protection Regulation; processor notification to the controller without undue delay under Article 33(2) | The same 4-hour notification, which is materially inside "without undue delay" |
| United Arab Emirates | Facility and authority obligations under the applicable health data and data protection legislation | The same 4-hour notification |
Pensieve Labs operates one notification standard rather than a per-market one, because the
tightest clock in the portfolio is six hours and a per-market standard would eventually be applied to the
wrong market.
Enough for the hospital to file its own report without asking a second question:
DPA-GL-001 Annexure I and DIS-GL-022.Pensieve Labs has done so far.Pensieve Labs's assessment, of a type listed in CERT-In Annexure I,
because that determines whether the hospital's six-hour clock is running.Where a fact is not yet known, the notification says so. Pensieve Labs does not delay a
notification until everything is known; it notifies with what it has and updates. A complete notification
sent after the hospital's clock has expired is worthless.
| Severity | Definition | Notification |
|---|---|---|
| S1: Critical | Confirmed or suspected unauthorised access to, disclosure of, alteration of or loss of customer data; or a total loss of service | 4-hour commitment applies. Incident commander named immediately |
| S2: High | A control failure with material potential to lead to S1; substantial degradation of service; confirmed compromise of a Pensieve Labs system not holding customer data |
4-hour commitment applies where customer data may be affected; otherwise notified in the next service communication |
| S3: Medium | A security event requiring action but with no realistic path to customer data | Recorded; included in reporting to the hospital on request |
| S4: Low | Security-relevant events handled by routine process | Recorded |
| Phase | What happens |
|---|---|
| Detect | From monitoring and alerting, a hospital report, a researcher report under POL-GL-059, or a sub-processor notice |
| Triage | Severity assigned; an incident commander is named. The 4-hour clock started at awareness, not at triage |
| Contain | Isolate the affected component, revoke credentials and sessions, block the path. Containment precedes root-cause analysis |
| Notify | Affected hospitals inside 4 hours. Pensieve Labs's own regulatory notifications and any sub-processor notifications proceed in parallel |
| Eradicate and recover | Remove the cause; restore service per DIS-GL-014 Section A5; verify integrity before restoring access |
| Review | A written post-incident review with root cause, timeline, contributing factors, and remediation actions with named owners and dates |
Evidence handling. Logs, images and artefacts relevant to an incident are preserved in immutable storage
(DIS-GL-013 Section 2) and are not modified during the investigation. Where a hospital may need them for its own
regulatory filing or a legal proceeding, Pensieve Labs provides them on request.
Every hospital affected by an S1 or S2 incident receives the written review, within 10 business days of containment or a dated interim review stating why the final one is delayed. It contains:
A missed target is recorded, not reclassified. A review that never reports a missed target is a review nobody is reading.
Pensieve Labs runs an incident-response tabletop exercise on a scheduled cadence and publishes a
two-page summary: the date, the scenario, participants by role, the decisions taken, the clock performance
against each statutory window, and the remediation actions with owners.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Date of most recent exercise | [TO BE SUPPLIED] |
| Scenario | [TO BE SUPPLIED] |
| Measured time to notification against the 4-hour commitment | [TO BE SUPPLIED] |
Stated plainly: as at
31 July 2026no tabletop exercise has yet been run and published.WPR-GL-005Section 5 carries the owner and target date. The commitment in Section 1 stands regardless; the exercise is howPensieve Labsdemonstrates it can meet it before it has to.
| Model | Who detects | Who declares | Who notifies the regulator | Pensieve Labs's limitation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
DM-1 / DM-2 |
Pensieve Labs monitoring, or the hospital |
Either | Hospital: it is the Data Fiduciary. Pensieve Labs supplies the content |
None |
DM-3 |
Pensieve Labs monitoring inside the hospital's project, and the hospital's own tooling |
Either | Hospital | Pensieve Labs sees what the hospital's IAM grant allows it to see |
DM-4 |
Hospital | Hospital | Hospital | Pensieve Labs has no visibility of the hospital's hardware or network and cannot detect an incident on it. It will support an investigation and provide application-level analysis. A DM-4 hospital needs its own detection capability, and this document says so before the contract is signed rather than after the incident |
Where an incident originates with a sub-processor listed in DIS-GL-009, Pensieve Labs's 4-hour clock
starts when Pensieve Labs becomes aware, which may be later than when the sub-processor became aware.
Pensieve Labs cannot commit to a notification time it does not control, and does not pretend to.
What it commits to is: notifying inside 4 hours of its own awareness; passing through the sub-processor's
own account of the incident; and stating in the notification when the sub-processor says it became aware,
so the hospital can see the gap.
9.1 The 4-hour clock runs from Pensieve Labs's awareness. An incident that is not detected does not
start a clock. Section 9.2 is therefore the limitation that matters.
9.2 No 24×7 staffed security operations centre. Detection is by automated alerting routed to an on-call
engineer, not by a staffed watch floor. A slow, quiet intrusion outside business hours depends on the
alerting rules being right. Pensieve Labs describes this as monitoring with on-call response and does
not describe it as a SOC. WPR-GL-001 Section 17.2.
9.3 No DM-4 detection. Section 7.
9.4 No forensic retainer in place today. For an incident requiring independent digital forensics,
Pensieve Labs would engage a firm at the time rather than under a standing retainer, which costs
hours. WPR-GL-005 Section 5 carries the status.
9.5 No cyber liability insurance certificate published yet. WPR-GL-005 Section 5 carries the owner and target
date. A hospital for whom vendor insurance is a procurement gate should raise it at qualification.
9.6 Untested. Section 6. The commitment is contractual and the process is documented; neither has been exercised against a clock.
9.7 Pensieve Labs does not report to a regulator on the hospital's behalf, and cannot. The
obligation is the Data Fiduciary's.
Pensieve Labs about an incident| Purpose | Channel |
|---|---|
| Suspected incident affecting a live deployment | The Severity 1 escalation path in SLA-GL-001, and info@pensievelabs.org in parallel |
| Vulnerability report from a researcher | info@pensievelabs.org, also published in /.well-known/security.txt per RFC 9116 (POL-GL-059) |
| Privacy or Data Principal matter | info@pensievelabs.org |
| Request for an incident record relating to your own tenant | info@pensievelabs.org |
Use both channels for a suspected incident. Redundancy costs nothing and a single channel eventually fails.
| Question | Document |
|---|---|
| The contractual breach clause and its definitions | DPA-GL-001 clause 10 |
| Severity definitions, response times and support hours | SLA-GL-001 |
| What is logged and for how long | DIS-GL-013, DIS-GL-034 |
| Recovery and restore | DIS-GL-014 / DIS-GL-015 |
| Vulnerability remediation targets | DIS-GL-017 |
| Researcher disclosure and safe harbour | POL-GL-059 Vulnerability Disclosure Policy |
| Who else is in the chain | DIS-GL-009 Subprocessor Register |
| Version | Date | Author | Summary |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.0.0 | 31 July 2026 |
Pensieve Labs Security |
First published edition. 4-hour notification commitment stated with its arithmetic. Three-clock model published. Absence of a rehearsal, a forensic retainer and an insurance certificate published as limitations. |